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ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL FEASIBILITY UNDER THE
CLEAN AIR ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970
I. Introduction
In passing the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970,' Congress instructed the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to set the desired level of air quality
as high as necessary to protect the public health. In further imposing a three-year
deadline for the attainment of this standard, this Act constituted the most strin-
gent environmental legislation passed to that date.
Previous air pollution legislation had allowed the state administrator, in
establishing air quality standards and developing plans for the attainment of
these standards, to consider the economic and technological feasibility of alter-
native plans.2 In addition to granting the EPA the authority to establish national
air quality standards, Congress omitted any reference to economic and tech-
nological factors in § 110, which directs the states to develop implementation
plans for the attainment of the air quality standards. This omission has caused
confusion concerning the relevance of economic and technological feasibility
factors to actions taken under § 110. Industry representatives have maintained
that these factors must be given consideration in implementing pollution control
standards, warning of severe economic disruption if they are not considered.
Environmentalists counter by claiming that Congress was primarily concerned
with the achievement of a healthful level of air quality and intended that
economic factors not interfere with this objective. The EPA and several court
decisions have taken a middle ground, asserting that Congress intended that the
states be free to consider or ignore these factors as they wished, as long as the
EPA-imposed air quality standards are attained. The soundness of these con-
flicting views will be examined against a background of the legislative history of
the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, and subsequent federal regulations and
court decisions.
II. Background: Previous Legislation and Statutory Framework of the
1970 Amendments
The Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 marked a significant step in a
national effort to control air pollution. Previous legislation had left the primary
responsibility for establishing and enforcing air quality standards to the states,
with the federal government assuming the limited role of assisting the states with
research and technical guidance. Because of the economic and administrative
burdens of the legislation, the states were unable to develop programs capable of
enforcing strict air pollution standards.' The Amendments of 1970 were designed
1 42 U.S.C. § 1857-1858(a) (1970).
2 Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485, as amended, Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857-
1858(a) (1970).
3 A discussion of the problems arising under the 1963 and 1967 Air Quality Acts may be
found in Note, Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970: A Congressional Cosmetic, 61 GEORO ETOW"
L.J. 153, at 157 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Congressional Cosmetic].
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to correct the "regrettably slow" 4 progress made in controlling air pollution since
the enactment of the 1967 Air Quality Act.5
The 1967 Act had authorized the states to develop their own air quality
standards and emission limitations for achieving those standards. It directed the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare' to issue information on recom-
mended air pollution control techniques. These recommendations were required
to include data "on the latest available technology and economic feasibility of
alternative methods of prevention and control of air contamination including
cost-effectiveness analyses."' The approval of the Secretary of HEW was con-
tingent on the standards being consistent with these recommended control cri-
teria: if they were not consistent, the Secretary was authorized to issue standards
consistent with the criteria.' The legislation permitted numerous interruptions
through hearings and notice time periods which severely limited the effectiveness
of the states or the Secretary in establishing standards.9 More importantly, even
when the standards were finally implemented, they reflected an emphasis on the
economic and technological feasibility of achieving the standards.
Further indication of the reliance placed on these two factors in the 1967 Act
is found in the enforcement section which directed the court to give "due con-
sideration to the practicability and to the technological and economic feasibility of
complying with such standards... .'",' These sections, providing for the establish-
ment and enforcement of air quality standards, were extensively changed by the
1970 Amendments.
The 1970 Act enlarged the federal role in combatting air pollution by
providing for EPA promulgation of air quality criteria1 ' and national ambient air
quality standards. 2 The EPA administrator was directed to promulgate primary
and secondary ambient air quality standards for all air pollutants having an
adverse effect on the public health or welfare. The primary air quality standards
were to be based on criteria issued under § 108'" and, allowing "an adequate
margin of safety," were to be "requisite to protect the public health."' 4 Secondary
air quality standards, based also on § 108 criteria, were to be designed "to
4 H.R. REP. No. 91-1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 6 (1970).
5 Pub. L. No. 90-148, 81 Stat. 485, as amended, Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1857-1858(a)
(1970).
6 Before 1970, national air pollution legislation was administered through the National
Pollution Control Administration under the Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare.
President Nixon's Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970 transferred these functions to the En-
vironmental Protection Agency (EPA). Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970 § 2(a) (3), 3
C.F.R. 199-202 (1970).
7 Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 107(c), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1857-1858(a) (1970).
8 Id.
9 The lengthy procedures provided for in earlier air pollution legislation are discussed in
Congressional Cosmetic, supra note 3, at 155-156, n. 15.
10 Pub. L. No. 90-148, § 108(c) (4), § 108(h), as amended, 42 U.S.C. § 1857-1858(a)
(1970).
11 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-3 (1970).
12 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4 (1970). "Ambient" air quality standards refers to the total amount
of pollutants present in the atmosphere for any given area. Emission limitations, which the
states are responsible for establishing under the 1970 Amendments, refers to the amount of
pollutants discharged from any particular source.
13 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-3 (1970).
14 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(b)(1) (1970).
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protect the public welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects .... ,
In basing the primary standards on what is necessary to protect the public
health, and placing strict time limits for attainment of this level of air quality,
Congress arguably intended to place secondary emphasis on economic and
technological feasibility in the establishment and implementation of air quality
standards. This marked a shift from the 1967 Act, where as previously noted,
economic and technological feasibility played a significant role. 6
Controversy has arisen, therefore, under the 1970 Amendments regarding
the relevance of economic and technological feasibility considerations in state
implementation plans (hereinafter referred to as SIP's). Section 1107 instructs
states to adopt, after public hearings, a plan providing for the attainment, main-
tenance, and enforcement of the national primary and secondary air quality
standards. The administrator is required to approve or disapprove the plan
within four months of its submission to the EPA. He must approve the plan if he
determines that it was adopted after reasonable notice and public hearing and
if it meets the requirements of subparagraphs A through H of § 110(a) (2)."
The most important of these § 110 factors requires that the plan provide
for the attainment of the primary air quality standards "as expeditiously as
practicable," but in no case later than three years from the date of approval of
the plan, and the attainment of the secondary air quality standards within a
15 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-4(b)(2) (1970).
16 The factors of economic and technological feasibility were explicitly provided for in
some sections of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970. Section 108 instructs the EPA to
issue air quality criteria for the states and provide them with information on the available tech-
nology and costs of control. The difference, however, between this section and the related
one in the 1967 Act is apparent from the purposes for which the information was to be used. In
the 1967 Act, the control technology information was designed to aid the states in determining
the ambient air quality standards they wished to establish, while in the 1970 Amendments,
the information was simply to assist the states in determining sufficient emission limitations
levels to meet the national air quality standards established by the EPA.
Section 111 (42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6 *(1970)) permits the administrator to directly impose
"standards of performance" on all new sources of emissions. In establishing the standards of
performance, the administrator is to determine the standard reflecting "the degree of emission
limitation achievable through the application of the best system of emission reduction which(taking into account the cost of achieving such reduction) the Administrator determines has
been adequately demonstrated."
Section 111 represents the single section in the 1970 Amendments which specifically in-
corporates considerations of economics and technology into the establishment of standards.
This contrasts with the approach taken by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972 (33 U.S.C. §§ 1251 et seq. (Supp. II, 1972)) which incorporates these factors
directly into the standards both existing and new point sources must meet. By 1977, FWPCA
requires use of the "best practicable control technology currently available" '(Id. at § 1311(b)(1) (A)), and by 1983, use of the "best available technology economically achievable" (Id. at §
1311(b) (2) (A)).
17 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5 (1970).
18 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a)'(2) (1970). Section 110(a) (2) provides:
. ..The Administrator shall approve such plan, or any portion thereof, if he
determines that it was adopted after reasonable notice and hearing and that-(A) (i) in the case of a plan implementing a national primary ambient air
quality standard, it provides for the attainment of such primary standard as ex-
peditiously as practicable but (subject to subsection (e)) in no case later than three
years from the date of approval of such plan (or any revision thereof to take ac-
count of a revised primary standard); and (ii) in the case of a plan implementing
a national secondary ambient air quality standard, it specifies a reasonable time at
which such secondary standard will be attained;(B) it includes emission limitations, schedules, and timetables for compliance
with such limitations, and such other measures as may be necessary to insure at-
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"reasonable time."' 9 Significantly, there is no mention of economic or tech-
nological feasibility in subparagraphs A through H. This omission has con-
tributed to the current confusion regarding the proper place of economic and
technological feasibility factors in SIP's. Does the omission indicate that the
factors are irrelevant under § 110? May a state include consideration of these
factors in their implementation plan? Is the EPA required to consider these
factors in appoval or disapproval of an SIP? These questions warrant further
examination in the following sections.
III. Economic and Technological Feasibility Within SIP's
A. Congressional Intent
The legislative history of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 indicates
considerable concern over the role of economic and technological feasibility
factors in implementation of the air quality standards. The House version of the
bill,2" a less radical departure from previous legislation than the Senate bill,2
contained language permitting consideration of economic and technological
feasibility in several places throughout the Act. The most significant of these
was § 4(c) (4), where, in enforcement suits brought by the attorney general to
secure compliance with the air quality standards, the district court was directed
tainment and maintenance of such primary or secondary standard, including, but
not limited to land use and transportation controls;
(C) it includes provision for establishment and operation of appropriate devices,
methods, systems, and procedures necessary to (i) monitor, compile, and analyze
data on ambient air quality, and (ii) upon request, make such data available to the
administrator;
(D) it includes a procedure, meeting the requirements of paragraph (4), for
review (prior to construction or modification) of the location of new sources to
which a standard of performance will apply;
(E) it contains adequate provisions for intergovernmental cooperation, includ-
ing measures necessary to insure that emissions of air pollutants from sources located
in any air quality control region will not interfere with the attainment or mainte-
nance of such primary or secondary standard in any portion of such region outside of
such state or in any other air quality control region;
(F) it provides (i) necessary assurances that the state will have adequate
personnel, funding, and authority to carry out such implementation plan, (ii)
requirements for installation of equipment by owners or operators of stationary
sources to monitor emissions from such sources, (iii) for periodic reports on the nature
and amounts of such emissions, (iv) that such reports shall be correlated by the
state agency with any emission limitations or standards established pursuant to this
chapter, which reports shall be available at reasonable times for public inspection;
and (v) for authority comparable to that in section 1857h-1 of this title, and ade-
quate contingency plans to implement such authority;
(G) it provides, to the extent necessary and practicable, for periodic inspection
and testing of motor vehicles to enforce compliance with applicable emission
standards; and
(H) it provides for revision, after public hearings, of such plan (i) from time to
time as may be necessary to take account of revisions of such national primary or
secondary ambient air quality standard or the availability of improved or more
expeditious methods of achieving such primary or secondary standard; or (ii) when-
ever the administrator finds on the basis of information available to him that the
plan is substantially inadequate to achieve the national ambient air quality primary
or secondary standard which it implements.
19 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2) (A) (1970).
20 H.R. REP. No. 91-1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 25-55 (1970).
21 S. RP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 68-129 (1970).
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to give "due consideration to the practicability and to the technological and
economic feasibility of complying with provisions of the plan... . 122 Clearly, this
provision would have forced the states to consider these factors in their imple-
mentation plans. This provision, however, was never included in the Senate bill
and is not present in the final bill.23
Although ostensibly the House bill was adopted, a close reading of the
final bill indicates that the stronger Senate measure was actually finally approved
by Congress.24 Throughout the Senate Report and debates are references to the
relevance of economic and technological factors. The Senate Report states:
In the committee discussions, considerable concern was expressed
regarding the use of technical feasibility as the basis of ambient air standards.
The committee determined that 1) the health of people is more important
than the question of whether the early achievement of ambient air quality
standards is technically feasible; and 2) the growth of pollution load in many
areas, even with the application of available technology, would still be
deleterious to public health.25
The dominant theme of the bill, as expressed in this passage and elsewhere,2"
was that the protection of the public health should serve as the primary basis for
controls. The legislation directed the administrator to establish primary standards
sufficiently strict to protect the public health,2" and the states, as provided by §
110, were to develop plans to meet those standards. The Senate committee ap-
parently recognized and approved of the potential harshness of this position,
stating that "the committee determined that existing sources of pollution either
should meet the standard of the law or be closed down....
22 H.R. REP. No. 91-1146, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 33 (1970).
23 During the 1972 hearings on implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments,
Senator Eagleton, one of the members of the conference committee, recalled,
On this matter of an economic factor, I am as positive as a mortal can be, that
was specifically written out of the bill because many hours were spent in conference
debating the economic feasibility factor and the House had such language in the
bill as: "giving due consideration to economic and technological feasibility of
compliance." That appeared in more than one place in the House bill and it was
stricken from the bill in conference to go back to the Senate version which had no
economic factor as far as protection of public health was concerned.
Hearings on Implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 Before the Senate
Public Works Committee, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 21 (1972).
24 See National Resources Defense Council (NRDC) v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905, 914, n. 14
(9th Cir. 1974). See also, H.R. Rmp. No. 91-1783, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 44-45 (1970)
(Conference Report); Hearings on Implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of
1970, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., part 1, at 19, 21, 24 (1972). Contra, Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA,
481 F.2d 162, 168-69 (6th Cir. 1973).
25 S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 2-3 (1970).
26 Id. at 238-39.
27 In basing the primary ambient air quality standards on that necessary to protect the
public health, Congress recognized that this did not encompass the level of air quality neces-
sary to protect the health of persons dependent on controlled environments, such as intensive
care patients, or infants in nurseries. Evidencing the high level of air quality the Congress
did anticipate meeting this standard would require, however, the Senate Report indicates
that persons whose health was to be protected included ". . . citizens such as bronchial
asthmatics and emphysematics who ... are exposed to the environment." Thus in establishing
the primary air quality standards, that level of air quality necessary to protect the health of
"particularly sensitive" individuals must be referred to. S. lni. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d
Sess. 10 (1970).
28 S. REP. No. 1196, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1970).
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Senator Muskie's explanation of the Act's objectives made in presenting the
bill before the Senate further reveals the intention of Congress to attain the air
quality standards regardless of the costs involved. Noting that the Senate Report
on the 1967 Air Quality Act had warned against reliance on technological or
economic feasibility arguments to the detriment of the public health, Senator
Muskie stated that the Amendments of 1970 explicitly adopted this philosophy:
The first responsibility of Congress is not the making of technological
or economic judgements-or even to be limited by what is or appears to be
technologically or economically infeasible. Our responsibility is to establish
what the public interest requires to protect the health of persons. This may
mean that people and industries will be asked to do what seems to be im-
possible at the present time. But if health is to be protected, these challenges
must be met.29
Recognizing, however, that instances may arise where compliance with the
primary air quality standards could not be met for economic or technological
reasons beyond the control of the individual source, Congress included variance
procedures in § 110. Both § 110(e)"0 and § 110(f) 1 permit economic and
technological considerations, under specified conditions, to be factors in extending
the deadlines if the absence or unavailability of necessary technology will prevent
attainment of the standards. While these provisions allow some flexibility, they
further indicate the intent of Congress to limit the consideration of economic
and technological factors to individual, case by case situations and not to the
initial establishment of an SIP.
B. EPA Position
The EPA has wavered in its position regarding the extent to which economic
and technological feasibility is to be considered under the 1970 Amendments.
Shortly after enactment, the EPA distributed a paper to the states to assist them
in preparing the SIP's. In these guidelines, the states were instructed not to
include provisions for social and economic cost factors as relevant considerations
of a state agency in implementing their program. The EPA at that time ap-
parently felt that programs including such factors would direct the emphasis of
the law away from considerations of public health.
In the later guidelines issued by the EPA which are currently in effect, a
contrary position was taken. These guidelines provide that in the development of
SIP's,
Nothing in this part shall be construed in any manner: ...
(b) to encourage a state to adopt any pollution control strategy without
taking into consideration the cost-effectiveness of such control strategy in
29 116 CONG. REc. 32901-32902 (1970) (remarks of Senator Muskie).
30 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(e) (1970).
31 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(f) (1970).
32 ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, AIR POLLUTION CONTROL OFFICE, NECESSARY
LEGISLATIVE CONSIDERATIONS FOR COORDINATED LOCAL, STATE, AND FEDERAL AIR POLLUTION
CONTROL PROGRAM S (1971).
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relation to that of alternative control strategies, . . .
(d) to encourage a state to prepare, adopt, or submit a plan without taking
into consideration the social and economic impact of the control strategy set
forth in such plan, but not limited to transportation and employment. 3
The present regulations thus permit the states to consider economic and
technological feasibility in the development and operation of an SIP, while
presumably retaining the position that the EPA cannot reject an SIP for in-
adequate consideration of economic and technological feasibility factors. This is
substantially the same position the EPA has taken throughout the long series of
court decisions involving the implementation of state plans."
An examination of the federal-state relationship created by the Act reveals
the basis on which the EPA founded the interpretation reflected in the regula-
tions. Contrasted with § 111ss which permits the EPA to impose national
emissions limitations on all new sources of pollution, the states were left free to
develop their own emission limitations for all existing sources of pollution. 6 The
limitations they establish must amount in the aggregate to no more than the level
of ambient air quality as prescribed by the EPA. These emission limitations may
be adopted on the basis of several models,"7 with considerable flexibility left to the
states to choose among and modify the models. The EPA interpretation indicates
this flexibility includes the right to use economic and technological feasibility
factors to determine the most efficient manner for attaining the national air
quality standards." The arguable conflict of this view with the overall legislative
history which seems to remove economic and technological factors from consider-
33 40 C.F.R. § 51.2 (1972). It has been suggested that the EPA's abrupt change in position
was in response to political pressure applied by the Nixon Administration. See Congressional
Cosmetic, supra note 3, at 172-76.
These regulations were subjected to harsh scrutiny during the 1972 Implementation
Hearings, at one point prompting Senator Eagleton's comment, previously set out in note 23,
supra. At a later point Eagleton appeared to be satisfied by an answer given by Administrator
Ruckelshaus, to the effect that although economic and technological feasibility factors cannot
be taken into consideration in setting the air quality standards, the states may be permitted to
use cost factors in developing the most efficient programs to meet those standards. See note
38, infra.
34 See Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1975), St. Joe Minerals v. EPA,
508 F.2d 743 (3rd Cir. 1975), NRDC v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905 (9th Cir. 1974), NRDC v. EPA,
489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974), NRDC v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1973).
35 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-6 (1970).
36 In general, existing stationary sources of air pollution are so numerous and diverse
that the problems they pose can most efficiently be attacked by state and local
agencies. Even with air quality standards being set nationally, dealing with existing
stationary sources would necessarily vary from one state to another and, within
states, from one area to another.
2 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE CLEAN Am AcT AMENDmENTS OF 1970, at 984 (1974).
37 One way of establishing these emission limitations is by requiring industry to use the
"best available technology" in controling emissions. See generally, Congressional Cosmetic,
supra note 3, at 163-64. It should be noted, however, that merely the application of best
available technology is no guarantee of achieving the national ambient air quality standards.
If, for example, the sources were very numerous in a particular area, even with application of
the best technology, the amount of pollution in the air may still exceed the standards. See,
Hearings on Implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 Before the Senate
Public Works Committee, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., part 1, 276-77 (1972).
38 An explanation of the extent to which this interpretation would permit the states to
consider economic and technological feasibility in development of their state plans was given
by Administrator Ruckelshaus during the 1972 Implementation Hearings. Although these
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ation is reconcilable. The Senate Report and the Senate debate concentrate on
the irrelevance of economic and technological feasibility with respect to establish-
ment of the national ambient air quality standards, which must be based on
public health considerations, and not on the manner in which the states choose to
attain these standards.
Reflecting the fact that the 1970 Amendments were subject to varying in-
terpretations, many disputes arose during the administration of the Act. En-
vironmental groups maintained that economic and technological feasibility
factors were eliminated from consideration under the Act, while industry at-
tempted to force the inclusion of these factors at various stages in the implementa-
tion process. The following section will examine the judicial approaches to these
arguments.
IV. State and EPA Consideration of Economic and Technological
Feasibility in State Implementation Plans
A. Industry Challenges to SIPs and Judicial Responses
1. Judicial Review of EPA Approval: § 307 (b) (1)
Industry reaction to the Amendments of 1970 was predictable. Faced with
significant increases in costs from attempts to meet emission limitations, industry
spokesmen argued that these costs should be included as factors in decision-
making under the Act. 9 Pursuant to the EPA regulations, some states were
already allowing economic and technological feasibility considerations to be
raised at state hearings conducted as a prerequisite to development of the im-
plementation plan40 and were incorporating these factors into the plan itself.41
However, industry found itself at the mercy of the states in this respect, and
several states either did not include consideration of economic and technological
factors in development of the plan, or failed, in industry's judgment, to apply
these considerations appropriately. If state appeal procedures were unavailable
to industry or an appeal was unlikely to succeed, then appeal to the EPA ad-
ministrator was attempted. However, under EPA's construction of the Act, EPA
hearings in addition to the state hearings were not required prior to the admin-
factors could not be considered in setting the standards, he said the states could consider them
in determining the most efficient way to meet those standards. Thus instead of applying 85
percent reduction levels to three emitters and risk putting one out of business, the EPA reg-
ulations would permit placing levels of reduction of 90, 85, and 80 percent. This could still
achieve the same ambient air quality and avoid forcing plants out of business.
39 See note 106 and accompanying text supra.
40 Section 110 requires that a state first hold a public hearinq before adoption of an
implementation plan or revision. If a state fails to hold such a hearing, the administrator of
the EPA must do so. 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (2), § 1857c-5(c) (1970).
41 Indeed, the Eighth Circuit interpreted the language found in the Senate Report-
"These matters (technology and other considerations) would have been settled in the ad-
ministrative procedures leading to an implementation plan or emission control provision"--
to mean that technological feasibility considerations should be raised in the required state
hearings prior to submission of an SIP. Union Electric Co. v. EPA, 515 F.2d 206, 216 (8th
Cir. 1975).
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istrator's action on the plan. 2 Thus, in industry's view, SIP's were effected with-
out giving appropriate consideration to factors of economic and technological
feasibility.
These plans were subsequently attacked through § 307(b)(1)4" which
provides for judicial review of any administrator's action in approving an SIP.
In determining the scope of review of the administrator's action, courts have gen-
erally looked to the Administrative Procedure Act and the standard set forth in
Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe:"
1) Whether the action was within the scope of the agency's authority;
2) Whether the agency conformed to procedural requirements; and 3)
Whether the agency decision was arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise not n accordance with law.4 6
The first two of these standards were never seriously disputed with respect to
EPA approval of an SIP. Clearly, approval of an SIP was within the scope of
the EPA's authority and the procedure for such approval was fairly straight-
forward.48 This left industry with the argument that the EPA's failure to con-
sider economic and technological feasibility in approval of an SIP constituted an
arbitrary or capricious act or an abuse of discretion.
Acceptance of this argument would be an effective rejection of the legislative
history of the Act. If the congressional intent dictates that the EPA not consider
these factors, it could hardly be an abuse of discretion to implement this intent.
Even acknowledging this concern however, the Overton Park test still represented
a fairly tough standard and industry met with little success."9
2. Enforcement Actions
Arguments to allow industry to raise economic and technological factors as
defenses in enforcement action under § 113 have been more successful. 50 This
42 Courts have generally agreed with this interpretation. "... . If the state hearings were
adequate [the administrator is] . . . not required, prior to approving the state plans, to extend
to the petitioners ... an opportunity to be heard." Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d
495, 502 (4th Cir. 1973). See also Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 172 (6th Cir.
1973).
43 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)(1) (1970).
44 5 U.S.C. §§ 550 et seq. (Supp. V, 1975).
45 401 U.S. 402 (1971).
46 Id. at 415-17. See also, State of Texas v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289, 296-97 "(5th Cir. 1974).
47 See 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (1970).
48 Id.
49 Although we do not read the Act as requiring the EPA to engage in exhaustive cost
benefit studies or to initiate elaborate planning exercises, it could be arbitrary and
capricious for the Agency to reject obviously less burdensome but equally effective
controls in favor of more expensive or onerous ones. But we think a considerable part
of the burden of suggesting attractive alternative strategies is upon those, like the
petitioners, who dislike the present ones. The record discloses that the administrator
has chosen rationally among the viable alternatives presented. We conclude that he
did not abuse his discretion or go beyond his statutory authority with respect to
the economic and social aspects of the plan.
South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646, at 676 (1st Cir. 1974). See also State of Texas
v. EPA, 499 F.2d 289 (5th Cir. 1974).
50 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8 (1970).
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section permits the EPA to issue abatement orders and to institute civil actions in
instances where an individual source of air pollution is in violation of require-
ments under an SIP. Although the language directing courts to give "due con-
sideration to the practicability and to the technological and economic feasibility
of compliance"51 in enforcement actions was deleted from the final bill, many
courts have accepted a fairly ingenious argument which permits industry to raise
economic and technological feasibility factors as defenses in state and federal en-
forcement actions. Since § 307(b) (2) 2 restricts judicial review in enforcement
proceedings to those issues not reviewable at the time of approval under §
307 (b) (1) , courts have determined that if the EPA was not permitted to con-
sider economic or technological factors in approval or disapproval of an SIP,
then these issues could be raised in an enforcement suit.5" Notwithstanding the
dubious validity of this interpretation of the Act, it has found judicial favor,
allowing industry to raise these economic and technological objections in en-
forcement proceedings.
This view of the Act confuses the issues involved in the interpretation of §
110. If economic and technological feasibility factors may be raised as defenses in
enforcement actions, this would force the states and EPA to consider these factors
initially in the design and approval of an SIP. It would be pointless for the states
and EPA to exclude economic and technological feasibility factors from the
implementation process of the Act, if they were later forced to consider them in
enforcement actions. Thus, a holding that these factors are appropriately raised
in § 113 enforcement proceedings in effect dictates that economic and tech-
nological factors be considered in the implementation process under § 110
without ever specifically examining whether that was the intent of Congress.
3. Court-ordered Hearings
In some instances, seeking to force consideration of economic and tech-
nological feasibility factors, courts have created a new stage in the implementa-
tion process, and have ordered the EPA to hold hearings at which these factors
could be raised by industry. These cases have arisen infrequently, and have
resulted from the dual state-federal enforcement procedures provided for in the
Act.55 In Getty Oil v. Ruckelshaus5 the operators of an oil refinery failed to
challenge the EPA's approval of the Pennsylvania SIP in a § 307 (b) (1) pro-
ceeding and instead attempted to obtain a variance through state-created pro-
51 See notes 22-23 and accompanying text supra.
52 Section 307 (b) (2) provides: "Action of the Administrator with respect to which review
could have been obtained under paragraph (1) shall not be subject to judicial review in
civil or criminal proceedings for enforcement." 42 U.S.C. § 1857h-5(b)'(2) (1970).
53 Section 307 (b) (1) provides for review in the United States Court of Appeals in the
appropriate circuit of action taken by the administrator in approving an implementation plan
under § 110. The petition for review must be filed within 30 days of approval. 42 U.S.C. §
1857h-5(b) (1) (1970).
54 Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. EPA, 509 F.2d 839, 845 (7th Cir. 1975). See
also Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 173 (6th Cir. 1973).
55 42 U.S.C. § 1857c-8, § 1857d-I (1970).
56 467 F.2d 349'(3rd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 (1973).
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cedures57 A state injunction was granted halting state enforcement of the plan
while the variance procedure was pending, but since the EPA was not bound by
the state injunction, it commenced federal enforcement proceedings against
Getty. Getty was denied federal relief and was instructed that the only remedy
for challenging an approved SIP was § 307. This placed Getty in the awkward
position of defending in federal prosecution its failure to comply with require-
ments it was attempting to alter through state processes.
A remedy for the Getty Oil dilemma was provided by the Third Circuit in
Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA."' Faced with a similar situation, the court termed
the Getty Oil result "fundamentally unfair," and gave the EPA two choices. The
EPA could either refrain from enforcement activities during the pendency of
the state variance proceedings or, alternatively, hold a limited legislative hearing
at which the industries would be permitted to file comments pertaining to the
economic or technological feasibility of the SIP.59 The Third Circuit, then,
seemingly assumed that the companies were able to raise economic and tech-
nological feasibility factors at some stage in the implementation process, and,
having lost the opportunity to do so in a § 307(b) (1) petition, these companies
should be permitted to raise them in a hearing prior to enforcement.
4. Legislative Amendments
Although successful in forcing consideration of economic and technological
feasibility factors in some instances under the Act, the discretionary manner in
which these concerns may be included has led industry to seek an explicit state-
ment of this obligation on the part of states and the EPA. In the 1975 imple-
mentation hearings, 0 industry representatives submitted several statements to
Congress, expressing the need for an amendment to the Act instructing both
states and the EPA to consider economic and technological feasibility in admin-
istration of the Act.6 These attempts have failed and the basic question regarding
the relevance of economic and technological feasibility to EPA and state de-
cision-making remains."s
57 See note 69 infra.
58 481 F.2d 1 (3rd Cir. 1973).
59 Id. at 10. In a rather combative footnote, the Third Circuit noted that this was a
fairly innovative remedy,
... We recognize that in this situation we are operating on the frontiers of legal
thought, and any advance post that we take up is liable to the dangers of heavy
ground assault. But it is only by such expeditions that knowledge of the terrain ahead
may be gained.
Id. at 10, n. 49.
60 Hearings on Implementation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 Before the
Senate Public Works Committee, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. (1975).
61 Id. part 2 at 1311, 1313, 1348 (1975).
62 Attempts by industry to circumvent the difficulties encountered in the Clean Air Act
by application of the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) (42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970))
to the EPA have met with failure. NEPA requires all federal agencies to prepare an environ-
mental impact statement when contemplating any major action (Id. at § 4332(2) (c)). The
impact statement must include an assessment of the costs and benefits of the proposed action.
Through 1974, courts had unanimously agreed that NEPA did not apply to the EPA. In that
year the Energy Supply and Environmental Coordination Act of 1974 '(Pub. L. No. 93-319,§ 7(c) (1) (June 22, 1974)) became law; it specifically provides that no action taken under
the Clean Air Act falls within NEPA. Thus another attempt by industry to include considera-
tion of economic and technological feasibility factors under the Act failed.
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B. State Consideration
Notwithstanding doubts voiced by members of Congress," most courts have
maintained that economic and technological feasibility considerations are relevant
to designing state plans for the implementation of national air quality standards."'
Certainly the states have been guided by the EPA regulations which specifically
permit this inclusion.65 Some courts, however, caught between the fairly dear
legislative history of the Act, and the subsequent EPA regulations, have placed
limits on the extent to which these factors are relevant to state action.
In National Resources Defense Council v. EPA,66 an environmental group
(NRDC) brought suit against the EPA for a review of decisions made by the
administrator approving certain portions of the Rhode Island and Massachusetts
air pollution implementation plans. These portions permitted the state air pollu-
tion control director to consider social and economic factors and the practicability
of control technology in issuing abatement orders. The First Circuit in NRDC
rejected the EPA's contention that these provisions were mere "surplusage" and
a "nullity," and held that "to the extent. . . these provisions... are inconsistent
with the federal act, they must be disapproved."" The court, however, applied
the same rationale it had used concerning the question of state variance pro-
cedures,6" and divided the problem into two time periods. They held that while
in the period after attainment of the national air quality standards economic and
technological considerations were certainly not to play a part in decision-making
by the states, the greater need for flexibility during the preattainment period
permitted the state to exercise "greater discretion" in the issuance of abatement
orders.69 Presumably, this meant that while the court considered economic and
technological feasibility factors relevant to state action during this period, con-
63 See notes 27, 34 and accompanying text supra.
64 See South Terminal Corp. v. EPA, 504 F.2d 646 (1st Cir. 1974); NRDC v. EPA, 507
F.2d 905, 914 (9th Cir. 1974).
65 See note 41 and accompanying text supra.
66 478 F.2d 875 (1st Cir. 1973).
67 Id. at 889.
68 In administration of the 1970 amendments, a question arose as to the ability of the
states to maintain a variance procedure independent of the federal act provisions of §§ 110(e)
and 110(f). The EPA maintained that they were entitled to treat any state-granted variance
as a "revision" under § 110(a)(3). The NRDC contended that any state-granted variance
had to meet the strict substantive requirements of § 110(f) which provides the administrator
must determine that,
(A) good faith efforts have been made to comply with such requirements before
such date,
(B) such source (or class) is unable to comply with such requirement because
the necessary technology or other alternative methods of control are not available
or have not been available for a sufficient period of time,
(C) any available alternative operating procedures and interim control measures
have reduced or will reduce the impact of such source on public health, and,
(D) the continued operation of such source is essential to national security
or to the public health or welfare ...
42 U.S.C. § 1857-5(e) (f) '(1970).
The First Circuit accepted neither view and instead adopted a view dividing the
problem into two time periods. In the period after attainment of the primary- air quality
standards, the court held that § 110(f) was intended to be the sole procedure to gain an
exemption. During the pre-attainment period, however, the greater flexibility needed by the
states permitted them to exercise greater discretion in providing for "deferral mechanisms."
478 F.2d at 884-89.
69 Id. at 889.
sideration of these factors was not to interfere with the attainment of air quality
standards."
This conclusion substantially adopts the position formulated by the EPA in
the regulations previously discussed. The states are permitted to include economic
and technological feasibility considerations in both the development and the op-
eration of an SIP, but not in a manner that would interfere with attainment of
the national air quality standards. Assuming the standards are established at a
desirable level, there can be no real objection to this conclusion. If the air quality
standards will be attained, certainly there can be no opposition to attaining them
in a fashion which will result in the least disruption to industry.
A later case in the Fifth Circuit' reached a conclusion similar to the one in
the Rhode Island case, using a different method of analysis. In this suit the
NRDC was also opposing the EPA's approval of a state implementation plan
because the Georgia plan permitted state air pollution agencies to consider
economic, social, and technological factors in exercising their responsibilities under
the Act. The court held that inclusion of such provisions in the plan was viola-
tive of the Act insofar as they "were inconsistent with the congressional intent that
considerations of economic cost or technological feasibility be always subordinate
to considerations of public health. 2 The Fifth Circuit continued, "Congress
made it clear that cost and feasibility were not to be considered in meeting the
three-year deadlines for attaining national primary standards. Those standards
are set in terms of what is required for the protection of public health."73 Basing
its holding on the legislative history of the 1970 Amendments, the court concluded
that the Georgia provisions were "overinclusive" in failing to distinguish between
situations where cost and technological considerations are relevant and situations
where they are not. While recognizing the strong intent of Congress to remove
economic and technological factors from consideration, the Fifth Circuit followed
previous decisions in permitting consideration of these factors in certain circum-
stanes. "It is of course, appropriate for state air pollution control officials to take
into account cost and feasibility factors in most circumstances; their doing so is
proscribed only when those considerations are in conflict with considerations of
public health."7" These considerations presumably conflict with public health
when they interfere with attainment of the national primary air quality stan-
dards. This holding, then, reaches the same result as the earlier First Circuit
decision.
Train v. NRDC 5 decided by the Supreme Court in April of 1975, pre-
sumably resolved any remaining doubts regarding the extent to which a state may
include consideration of economic and technological feasibility factors in its SIP.
While the Georgia case discussed above was appealed to the Supreme Court
solely on the question of whether a state was permitted to operate independent
variance procedures, it also provides insight to the economic and technological
70 See also NRDC v. EPA, 483 F.2d 690, 694 (8th Cir. 1973).
71 NRDO v. EPA, 489 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1974).
72 Id. at 411.
73 Id.
74 Id.




In Train, the Supreme Court accepted the EPA view of the issue; that §
110(a) (3),"' the revision section, authorizes a state to grant variances which do
not interfere with the attainment or maintenance of national ambient air quality
standards. The revision section, according to the Court, authorizes action by thd
state as broad as that taken initially in development of the SIP. Further, EPA
action in approving or disapproving a state revision is limited to an examination
of whether the revision satisfies the requirements of § 110(a) (2), applicable to
the original SIP. Thus, the Court found that the revision section permits a state
to grant variances as long as the requirements of § 110(a) (2) are fulfilled."
Although whether a state may operate variance procedures independent of
those provided for in § 110, and what they may consider in granting variances
are different questions, the Train decision suggests that the state may consider
economic and technological factors without facing EPA disapproval of the plan
or revision if the attainment or maintenance of national air quality standards is
not interfered with. To this extent it reaches the same conclusion as previous
decisions. The decision, however, does not imply that the EPA can instruct a
state to include such factors, nor disapprove the plan or revision if not present.
These considerations remain irrelevant except so far as state consideration of these




The basic question involved in all the relevant decisions is the same; to what
extent must the EPA consider economic and technological feasibility in approv-
ing or disapproving an SIP? As stated in the previous section,"8 the EPA ap-
parently has the duty to disapprove any plan which permits a state to consider
76 Section 110(a) (3) provides,
The Administrator shall approve any revision of an implementation plan ap-
plicable to an air quality control region if he determines that it meets the require-
ments of paragraph (2) and has been adopted by the state after reasonable notice
and public hearing.
42 U.S.C. § 1857c-5(a) (3) (1970).
77 421 U.S. 60 (1975).
The Train decision may raise significant problems, notably one mentioned by the First
Circuit in NRDC v. EPA (478 F.2d 875). The difficulties of proving that any particular
variance granted to a source or class is going to prevent attainment of air quality standards
are considerable. When hundreds or thousands of emissions are occurring in an air quality
region, all contributing to the aggregate level of ambient air quality, the scientific evidence
necessary to show that one source will prevent attainment of the standards is simply not
obtainable. Yet the Supreme Court has apparently ordered the EPA to make these types of
judgments in determining whether a revision by a state deserves EPA approval.
Permitting the state to consider economic and technological feasibility in plans or revisions
under § 110 if the attainment of air quality standards is not interfered with, as the Train
decision suggests they may do, raises similar problems for the EPA. They are again placed in
a position of having to determine and prove that consideration of economic and technological
feasibility factors in this particular instance interferes with attainment or maintenance of the
national air quality standards.
78 See notes 76-78 and accompanying text supra.
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economic and technological factors, if the EPA determines such state considera-
tion will interfere with attainment of the national air quality standards. The
extent to which the EPA must consider these factors if a state inadequately
considers or omits them in submission of an SIP will be examined in this section.
The principal cases dealing with this question, St. Joe Minerals v. EPA, 9 and
Union Electric Go. v. EPA,"° have reached contrary conclusions.
a. St. Joe Minerals v. EPA
In St. Joe Minerals v. EPA, the Third Circuit was presented with a problem
arising from its order in Duquesne Light Co. v. EPA.8 In Duquesne, the court
had ordered the EPA to either refrain from enforcement proceedings during the
time the parties, Duquesne Light Company and St. Joe Minerals, sought vari-
ances from the state, or grant the companies a limited hearing to present economic
and technological feasibility objections. The EPA chose the latter option and con-
cluded that a portion of the Pennsylvania implementation plan was indeed in-
feasible.82 The EPA had further concluded, however, that it did not possess the
statutory authority to disapprove the plan on that basis. Instead it merely in-
formed the state director of its finding, and requested a revision. Furthermore,
the EPA offered to stay enforcement of the plan pending state administrative and
judicial review of the plan. St. Joe, understandably perturbed by this result,
sought review, alleging that the EPA's refusal to disapprove the plan was based
on an erroneous construction of § 110. The EPA argued that if § 110(a) (2) is
satisfied, then the mandatory language of that section and § 1168 require
it to approve an SIP even though it has found it to be technologically infeasible.
The court relied upon its earlier decisions in Duquesne4 and Getty Oil"5 in hold-
ing that the EPA can examine economic and technological feasibility in con-
sideration of an SIP, and is empowered to disapprove a plan on that basis if the
plan gives inadequate consideration to these factors. In Getty Oil the Third
Circuit, while disallowing relief from federal enforcement proceedings, had
assumed Getty could have raised economic and technological considerations in a
§ 307(b) (1) petition if it had brought the petition in a timely manner.86 Simi-
larly, the Third Circuit in Duquesne, without directly considering whether eco-
nomic and technological feasibility factors were relevant to § 110 action, ordered
the EPA to hold hearings at which the petitioners would be permitted to raise
economic and technological feasibility objections to the SIP. 7 Employing
circular reasoning, the Third Circuit in St. Joe cited these decisions and found
that clearly the EPA was empowered to disapprove an SIP for inadequate con-
79 508 F.2d 743 (3rd Cir. 1975).
80 515 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 35 (1975).
81 481 F.2d 1 (3rd Cir. 1973).
82 508 F.2d at 745.
83 Section 116 provides that a state may adopt any air quality standard or emission
limitation it wishes, as long as they are at least as strict as those required by the federal
standards. 42 U.S.C. § 1857d-1 (1970).
84 481 F.2d 1 (3rd Cir. 1973).
85 467 F.2d 349 (3rd Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1125 '(1973).
86 Id. at 359.
87 481 F.2d at 10.
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sideration of economic and technological feasibility factors. Obviously, said the
court, they would not have made those decisions if the EPA were not statutorily
able to consider these factors."8 This reasoning would be more convincing if the
court in Duquesne had actually considered the question of economic and tech-
nological feasibility. However, they simply ordered the subject raised at hearings
without determining whether the statute permitted such action.
The Third Circuit, in St. Joe, cited Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA9 as an
additional example of a court rejecting the EPA's claim that it was not entitled to
consider economic or technological feasibility in approving or disapproving SIP's
under § 110.0 The court in St. Joe followed the Fourth Circuit's finding in
Appalachian Power Co. and noted that during the four-month period the EPA
has to review an SIP, the plan is reviewed by an interagency committee composed
of representatives from the Federal Power Commission, Departments of Trans-
portation, Labor, Commerce, Interior, and the Office of Management and the
Budget. This committee is to review the "aggregate impact" of these SIP's and
provide assistance "in determining the availability of fuels, transportation
programs, and public and private sector investment."'" The Third Circuit in St.
Joe agreed with the Fourth Circuit's contention that in fulfilling these duties, it
is "inconceivable" that the committee does not "consider and evaluate the
technological and economic aspects of the plans under review."92
Although this is a reasonable presumption of what the committee might con-
sider in examining an SIP, this conclusion sidesteps the substantive issue of
whether the Act authorizes the EPA to disapprove an SIP on grounds of eco-
nomic or technological infeasibility. Rather than examining the Act itself for an
answer to this question, the Third Circuit chose to consider the procedure adopted
by the EPA and base its decision on speculation.
b. Union Electric Co. v. EPA
While the Third Circuit in St. Joe Minerals ignored the legislative history in
reaching its conclusion that the EPA can and must consider the economic and
technological feasibility aspects of an SIP, the Eighth Circuit in Union Electric
Co. v. EPA9 relied heavily upon this history in concluding that Congress left
consideration of these factors to the states, subject only to the requirement that
the plan adopted would attain the national air quality standards.94 The court
held further that the decisions made by the states regarding economics and
technology are not reviewable by the administrator, and thus not reviewable
by a court in a § 307(b) (1) petition. 5 Although relying partially on remarks
made by Senator Muskie in discussion of Title II of the 1970 Amendments
88 508 F.2d at 746-47.
89 477 F.2d 495 (4th Cir. 1973).
90 508 F.2d 74748.
91 Id. at 749.
92 Id. See also Appalachian Power Co. v. EPA, 477 F.2d 495, 506 (4th Cir. 1973).
93 515 F.2d 206 (8th Cir. 1975).
94 Id. at 216.
95 Id. See notes 53-55 and accompanying text supra.
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dealing with automotive emissions," instead of § 110, the court nevertheless con-
cluded that it was the intent of Congress to reduce economic and technological
feasibility considerations from the EPA's actions under the Act.9
2. Section 116
Section 116, which gives states the right to establish standards as strict as
they wish as long as the national air quality standards are attained, illustrates the
different rules the states and EPA play in the implementation and administrative
process. In Union Electric the utility contended that because its compliance
with emission limitations was not necessary to achieve the national primary air
quality standards for the area concerned, the EPA had authority to disapprove
that portion of the plan applying to the utility. This was simply an attempt to
broaden earlier decisions authorizing a state to base determinations on economic
and technological feasibility grounds as long as attainment of the national air
quality standards was not interfered with. Without expressly adopting that view,
the court rejected the proposal that the power to disapprove SIP's on economic
or technological infeasibility grounds also be extended to the EPA in instances
where attainment of the air quality standards would not be interfered with.
In dismissing this contention, the Eighth Circuit noted that § 116 insures
that "the states are free to adopt limitations even stricter than the federal and it
cannot be contended that the states are limited in their implementation plans to
doing no more than assuring that the national standards are to be met and
maintained.""5
Section 116's allowance for stricter standards than imposed by federal re-
quirements has played an interesting role in this issue of economic and tech-
nological feasibility. In several cases the EPA has argued that § 116 bars disap-
proval of an SIP on grounds of economic or technological infeasibility, maintain-
ing that states may adopt as strict a program as they desire, regardless of economic
or technological feasibility considerations. This argument, although rejected in
St. Joe Minerals,9 emphasizes the irrelevance of economic and technological
factors under the Act. Air quality standards equal to (or even less strict) than
the federally ordered standards may be economically or technologically im-
practical. However, Congress intended for them to be met, even at the cost of
some shutdowns."0 Likewise, the states are entitled to attain higher air quality
96 515 F.2d at 215, n. 29.
97 Id. at 215. This has been the conclusion reached by most courts who have considered
the matter. See NRDC v. EPA, 507 F.2d 905, 914 (9th Cir. 1974); NRDC v. EPA, 489
F.2d 390, 412 (5th Cir. 1974); NRDC v. EPA, 478 F.2d 875, 889 (1st Cir. 1973). In only
one instance was the opposite conclusion reached and this was based on a misreading of the
action taken by the conference committee. Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA, 481 F.2d 162, 168(6th Cir. 1973). The Sixth Circuit mistakenly concluded the House bill language had been
approved and not the Senate language.
98 515 F.2d at 220.
99 508 F.2d 743, 748 (3rd Cir. 1975).
100 See text accompanying note 28 supra.
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standards than federally required and these standards likewise cannot be disap-
proved for economic or technological reasons.1 '
V. Conclusion
In examining the vast legislative history, subsequent congressional hearings,
and cases involving the issue of economic and technological feasibility in the
Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970, several conclusions may be reached.
Congress intended to minimize the impact economic and technological consider-
ations could have on decision-making under the Act. In particular, the EPA
was not to consider these factors in either establishing the air quality criteria or
standards; nor were they to disapprove a plan for inadequate consideration of
these factors by the states. To the extent that St. Joe Minerals and Appalachian
Power Co. are inconsistent with this conclusion, they misinterpret § 110.
Arguably the states were left with the authority to consider these factors
as long as the attainment of the national air quality standards was not hindered,
which is an EPA determination. The states are, however, not required to con-
sider economics and technology in developing an SIP and may impose as strict
a set of standards as they wish. Finally, although inconsistent with the legislative
history of the Act, economic and technological feasibility considerations probably
may be raised as defenses in enforcement suits. 2
Serious questions remain, however, as to the practical role these factors
should play in effectuating a national air pollution control policy. A policy plac-
ing little emphasis on economic and technological feasibility factors could have
serious implications, including plant shutdowns with subsequent unemployment
and economic disruption. These potential effects have indeed been recognized
by several courts. In Buckeye Power, Inc. v. EPA,"3 the Sixth Circuit was unable
to accept the view that Congress foresaw and approved of the possibility of elec-
tric utilities being forced to shut down because of an inability to meet the required
emission standards. "If Congress intended such a far reaching result in the
1970 Amendments to the Act, it certainly would have mentioned such an inten-
tion in the body of Amendments.' 0
4
Additionally, in Union Electric, the Eighth Circuit recognized the potential
impact of its decision but concluded that the Act was clear in disallowing con-
sideration of economic and technological factors.
101 Other decisions upholding the duty of the administrator to approve an SIP without con-
sidering the economic or technological feasibility of the plan have seized upon the mandatory
language contained in section 110. In Indiana & Michigan Electric Co. v. EPA, 509 F.2d
839 (7th Cir. 1975), the Seventh Circuit stated that § 110 imposes a mandatory duty on the
administrator to approve the plan if it was adopted by the state after reasonable notice and
hearing, provides for the attainment of primary air quality standards "as expeditiously as
practicable" but "in no case later than three years from the date of approval," provides for
the implementation of secondary standards within a "reasonable time," and satisfies the re-
quirements of sub-paragraphs A-H of § 110(a) (2). A-H does not include the factors of
economic and technological feasibility, and it was this absence from otherwise detailed criteria
that the court found "highly significant." Id. at 844.
102 See note 55 and accompanying text supra.
103 481 F.2d 162 (6th Cir. 1973).
104 Id. at 168.
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Whether the public interest would be best served by closing plants or by
allowing some variances from the national program for clean air we cannot
say.... However it is not our role to sit as a super-legislature balancing the
necessity of compliance with the clean air standards against competing
economic and technological considerations.105
These concerns surrounding the use of economic data were also expressed
by industry representatives in seeking an amendment to the Clean Air Act during
the 1975 Implementation Hearings.' These spokesmen felt that economics were
among the most important considerations facing decision-makers designing or
implementing air pollution control technology. To ignore the economic factor,
urged the representatives, would be to risk severe consequences, including a large
number of unemployed, loss of supplies of energy, and disruption of the national
economy.
The importance of economic factors in industrial decision-making has gen-
erally been expressed in terms of a comparison of the costs and benefits of doing
or not doing some act. If the benefits to be earned in expansion of an industry
exceed the costs in doing so, the expansion should proceed. In the environ-
mental protection area, however, this cost-benefit analysis approach produces
questionable results. While the costs of implementing pollution control devices
are fairly easy to calculate, ascertaining the benefits constitutes a much more dif-
ficult problem. Traditionally, the avoidance of deleterious effects on vegetation,
crops, property, materials, and health has been interpreted as the benefits of
pollution reduction. 7 Of these, health benefits and aesthetic values have been
notoriously difficult to calculate.' As was indicated by spokesmen before the
subcommittee conducting the 1975 hearings, the difficulty in computing these
benefits lies in the translation of health effects and simple aesthetic values into
"hard" economic benefits.' These problems led the National Academy of
Sciences to conclude in a report prepared for the Senate Committee on Public
Works that cost-benefit analysis, although useful as a tool providing helpful in-
formation, should not be used "as a technique for making policy determinations
or for setting regulatory standards."' '
105 515 F.2d at 219.
106 See notes 61-62 and accompanying text supra.
107 BARKLEY & SECKLER, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND ENVIRONMENTAL DECAY 84 (1972).
108 This has led, in some instances, to simply ignoring the nonquantifiable benefits of
pollution reduction. Dr. John Knelson, Director of the Human Studies Laboratory of the EPA,
noted in his testimony before the Senate during the 1975 Implementation Hearings that,
[Ijhere are two basically different ways of interpreting health effects data with
respect to environmental control strategy. On the one hand, if data are inadequate
and contradictory, one can argue that control is not necessary because adverse health
effects have not been proven. If on the other hand, the data are inadequate and
contradictory, I think one can equally conclude that prudence dictates an even
greater margin of safety because precisely of the uncertain assessment of the po-
tential adverse health effect.
Hearings on Implemntation of the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970 Before the Senate
Public Works Committee, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 754 '(1975).
109 Id. at 30.
110 THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS OF COMPLIANCE WITH THE AuTo
EMISSION STANDARDS ESTABLISHED BY THE CLEAN Am ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970, S. Doc.
No. 93-16 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).
Similarly, Dr. Knelson stated,
Finally, in an attempt to respond directly to your question, have we been able to
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That economic and technological feasibility factors should be secondary con-
siderations in environmental decision-making is essentially the view adopted by
the Congress in passing the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1970. In basing the
amendments on what is necessary to protect the public health, Congress realized
that the Act might in some instances work harsh results, but felt such a measure
was necessary to achieve a healthy level of air quality.
Jon R. Robinson
put a dollar value on public health, of course we can't. Nobody is able to accurately
put a dollar value on human anguish and suffering and death and illness. There
are attributes of life that are not quantifiable in dollar terms. These are societal
decisions.
HEARINGS ON IMPLEMENTATION OF TRE CLEAN Ant ACT AMENDMENTS OF 1970 BEFORE
THE SENATE PUBLIC WORKS COMMITTEE, 94th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, p. 32 '(1975).
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